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Ag Carbon Credits 
In the global warming context, some states 
(California, and several New England and mid-
Atlantic states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative or RGGI) and some countries (most of 
Europe) are regulating carbon emissions from 
coal-fired power plants and large coal-burning 
industrial facilities (like cement factories). Often 
these carbon regulation programs allow regulated 
power and industrial plants to offset part of their 
emissions with carbon credits. 
Carbon credits are generated when businesses 
and entrepreneurs engage in activities that reduce 
the release of GHGs, such as converting from coal
-generated electricity to zero GHG electricity 
such as wind, solar, hydroelectric or nuclear pow-
er. Carbon credits may also be generated when a 
building or facility’s energy efficiency is im-
proved. These potential carbon credits must be 
documented or certified as truly representing a 
stated quantity of reduced or avoided carbon 
emissions before they can be approved to offset 
regulated carbon emissions from the power or 
industrial plant. Purchasing carbon credits can be 
less expensive than making the GHG emission 
reductions, although they are not a long-term 
substitute for making those GHG reductions.  
What are agricultural carbon credits? Foresters, 
ranchers and farmers can increase the storage of 
carbon from the air into the soil through im-
proved forest, grassland and cropland practices. A  
There is a lot of discussion in the ag community about 
ag carbon credits as part of a larger U.S. strategy to 
reduce carbon emissions and avoid the very worst im-
pacts of global warming. This newsletter takes us 
through some of the basics regarding what ag credits 
are and why they are a current topic of discussion.  
What are carbon credits? Carbon credits are some-
times purchased by businesses that are being required 
to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. A 
carbon credit typically represents one metric ton of 
carbon dioxide (CO2), the most prevalent GHG, and 
can be created by activities reducing GHG emissions, 
like reforestation.  
The carbon credit concept is based on the 1990 EPA 
acid rain program, where coal-fired power plants were 
required to lower their sulfur emissions by reducing 
the destruction of Canadian and U.S. forests by acidic 
precipitation (“acid rain”). All regulated coal-fired 
power plants were issued sulfur emission allowances 
that would over time require them to reduce annual 
sulfur emissions. (One sulfur emission allowance 
would authorize the emission of one ton of sulfur by 
the holder.) In response, some power plants lowered 
their emissions by replacing high-sulfur Appalachian 
coal with low-sulfur Wyoming Powder River Basin 
coal. Other power plants installed scrubbers to clean 
their emissions. These cleaner-burning power plants 
often had unused sulfur emission allocations, which 
the cleaner plants could sell to the dirty plants that 
had not yet started reducing their emissions.  
recent study estimates that improved agricultural land 
management (including forests) could increase annual 
carbon storage in soil by up to 21% of annual U.S. 
GHG emissions (Massey & Willett, p. 18). With Presi-
dent Biden’s goal of making the U.S. net carbon neutral 
by 2050, ag carbon credits from additional carbon se-
questration in forests, grasslands and cropland would 
be an important component of achieving that goal. 
(Net carbon neutral means that the U.S.’ net GHG 
emissions would be zero, which would require a sharp 
reduction in fossil fuel combustion.)   
What activities might generate ag carbon credits? 
Most tons of potential soil carbon storage come from 
forest management activities, avoided grassland con-
version to cropland and planting cover crops (Massey 
& Willett, p. 19). Other agricultural activities potential-
ly generating carbon credits include reduced tillage, 
reduced fertilizer applications, and capturing methane 
from livestock operations and converting it to electrici-
ty. In the U.S., the most ag carbon credits that have 
been certified for use in California and RGGI GHG 
regulatory programs are from forestry and methane 
capture from dairies.  
What are the different types of carbon markets? The 
two main categories are voluntary markets and compli-
ance markets.  
Voluntary carbon markets serve businesses and indi-
viduals who wish to offset some or all of their GHG 
emissions to accomplish business or personal sustaina-
bility goals but who are not legally required to do so. 
For example, when Al Gore travels to Europe to give a 
climate talk, he might purchase some carbon offsets to 
offset his share of the GHG emissions generated in his 
cross-Atlantic flight. Some families or businesses may 
purchase carbon credits to reduce the size of their col-
lective carbon footprint.  
Compliance carbon markets serve regulated entities 
who are legally required to reduce their GHG emis-
sions, such as the California, RGGI and EU programs 
previously mentioned.  
The primary difference between the two markets is the 
level of scrutiny activities are subject to before they 
qualify as certified carbon credits. The certification 
process for carbon credits in compliance markets is 
stricter than for the voluntary carbon markets. It is 
difficult to say how much of a difference there really is 
–- some voluntary certification programs are probably  
just as strict as the compliance certification pro-
grams. But there is no overall regulation of the vol-
untary carbon markets to assure that all carbon 
credits represent a metric ton of carbon reduction.  
What does the U.S. voluntary carbon market 
look like today? In 2019, renewable energy repre-
sented 42% of the carbon credits generated in the 
U.S. for the global voluntary carbon market 
(calculated from Donofrio et al., p. 1). Forestry 
and land use (including forestry offsets) represent-
ed 37%. Other U.S. carbon credit generating activi-
ties include waste disposal, chemical processes and 
industrial manufacturing, energy efficiency/fuel 
switching, and transportation (Donofrio et al., p. 
1). There is no central marketplace where these 
carbon credit purchases occur, virtually all of the 
trades are directly between buyer and seller with 
no intermediary (Donofrio et al., pp. 8, 9).     
What does the ag carbon credit market look like 
today? It is the wild, wild west. No rules or regu-
lations exist, so let the buyers and sellers all be-
ware. From where I sit, the two largest players ap-
pear to be speculators and pilot project developers.  
The speculators – in my opinion – are attempting 
to contract as many acres as they can with the ex-
pectation that carbon markets will explode in the 
next few years and they will sell their carbon cred-
its at a large profit. One source estimates that the 
U.S. voluntary carbon market will grow 1500% by 
2030 (Donofrio et al., p. 6). Speculators are placing 
their bets now and are willing to pay a premium to 
sign acres up early.  
The pilot projects (my characterization) are being 
developed by several different groups, many with 
agribusiness partners or connections. The basic 
idea is to sign up some acres and use them as a test 
to develop the soil carbon storage information to 
credibly document that the improved management 
practices have sequestered more carbon in the 
farm or ranch land. These firms or groups want to 
be the intermediary between ag producers and car-
bon markets or carbon credit buyers over the long 
haul. If you want to learn about these “pilot pro-
jects” google “agricultural carbon credits” or 
“carbon farming” and get comfortable because you 
will find many articles on this topic.  
What was the Obama carbon farming market like? 
The Kyoto climate treaty and President Obama’s pro-
posed GHG regulatory program led to the develop-
ment of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) from 
2003-2010. The CCX was organized to sell GHG 
emission allowances for GHG emission reduction 
and offset projects in North America and Brazil. The 
CCX went out of business in 2010 due to the failure 
of Congress to enact President Obama’s GHG regula-
tory program, which led to a lack of interest in trad-
ing carbon credits (Wikipedia).  
While the CCX was in existence, some groups at-
tempted to aggregate farmer contracts to increase soil 
storage (Leonard pp. 335-37). An interesting example 
is AgriGate Climate Credits Corp., a subsidiary of the 
Iowa Farm Bureau. The AgriGate farmer contracts 
were for a minimum of 5 years, and 20% of the car-
bon offsets generated were held back in a reserve 
pool to cover any carbon storage shortages (if some 
farmers did not complete their contracts, for exam-
ple). Any offsets remaining in the reserve pool at the 
end of the contract period were sold. The farmer ap-
plication process relied heavily on FSA information, 
which simplified the process. AgriGate sold carbon 
credits, deducted its costs and a 10% selling commis-
sion, and distributed the remainder to participating 
farmers (Leonard pp. 337-40). I would estimate that 
farmers probably received around half of the carbon 
credit sale proceeds. During this time the Nebraska 
Farmers Union was also very active in generating 
farmer carbon contracts.  
I will note here that the only reason we are discussing 
ag carbon credits today and back in the 2003-2010 
period is that there were then (and are today) wide-
spread expectations that the U.S. would then (and 
will soon) regulate carbon emissions from the power 
sector and industry. If there are no U.S. carbon regu-
lations that would encourage U.S. electricity produc-
ers and industries to purchase carbon credits, there is 
only a very small U.S. market for ag carbon credits. If 
President Biden’s clean energy programs fail to 
achieve Congressional approval, any momentum to-
wards developing a market in U.S. agricultural car-
bon credits will likely die.  
Are there issues with generating carbon credits on 
leased land? Yes, and they are significant.  
One drawback of agricultural carbon credits in 
cropland is that after the carbon contract expires the 
land can be plowed up and the stored carbon released  
back into the atmosphere. This possibility makes 
cropland carbon credits somewhat problematic, 
as the carbon sequestration is not necessarily per-
manent. This has led to long-term ag carbon con-
tracts, 10-20 years or more. This is not as large a 
problem for forests that are managed on a longer 
time frame than cropland. Grasslands may fall 
somewhere in between cropland and forests.  
The longer contract term to ensure longer soil 
carbon storage is somewhat at odds with typical 
farm leasing patterns in Nebraska and probably 
much of the Corn Belt. Most Nebraska farm leas-
es are handshake agreements for one year with no 
written lease. I suspect that most written leases 
are for one year also with specified renewal proce-
dures. This pattern has led at least one commen-
tator to suggest banning leased land from carbon 
markets (Duffy, p. 315). Certainly, if ag carbon 
markets become a significant source of farm in-
come, more farm leases will be written for a long-
er term to qualify for carbon market participa-
tion. That would be a dramatic change but it will 
happen if the carbon market financial incentives 
justify making the change.  
Over time, if the nations of the world remain 
committed to achieving their net-zero emissions 
by 2050 pledges, it likely will become necessary to 
adapt carbon contracts to facilitate carbon storage 
on leased farmland. But we are a long way from 
that point now, and it may be years before we 
reach that point.  
Should the USDA develop a carbon bank? Yes. 
The proposed USDA carbon bank would treat soil 
carbon storage like another conservation objec-
tive, similar to reducing soil erosion and prevent-
ing water pollution from agricultural production. 
The carbon bank could be operated similarly to 
the conservation reserve program, where farmers 
bid their land into the CRP and USDA takes the 
lowest qualifying bids. USDA conservation pro-
grams already deal with leased land issues, and 
the carbon bank could pay farmers to continue 
existing soil carbon storage rather than only pay-
ing for new practices. According to media ac-
counts, USDA Secretary Vilsack and President 
Biden favor developing a USDA carbon bank. Mr. 
Vilsack has indicated that USDA might pursue a 
pilot project which, if successful, could be the ba-
sis for proposing a much larger program to be  
approved by Congress. Major advantages of a USDA 
soil bank include much less farmer paperwork than 
carbon markets would likely require and an expanded 
opportunity for landlords and tenants to jointly par-
ticipate than carbon markets would likely provide, at 
least in the short and medium term.  
What about international carbon markets? There 
are no organized international carbon markets at pre-
sent. Several nations have established national carbon 
markets, including China, and there may be an EU 
carbon market. For carbon markets to become more 
robust, more countries must commit to net-zero 
GHG emissions by 2050 or some similar goal and 
back that commitment with action, including pro-
grams to regulate and substantially reduce GHG 
emissions within their borders. If that happens, car-
bon markets will sprout like dandelions, and market 
operators will see the value of coordination and coop-
eration. But the commitments and meaningful follow-
up actions have not yet occurred, so we will need to 
see what happens in the coming months and years.  
What should producers watch for? I would watch 
for government actions around the world but espe-
cially in the U.S., China and India to reduce carbon 
emissions. Without these carbon reduction require-
ments, there is no increased need or market for ag 
carbon credits. So don’t think that carbon reduction 
commitments make this all a done deal – they don’t. 
They would be a good first step but without follow-up 
regulatory programs, the commitments won’t mean 
much. The U.S. will be the best barometer of future 
progress on carbon reductions: if the Biden admin-
istration can get its soon-to-be-announced (we hope) 
Clean Energy Standard program approved by Con-
gress, we will be on our way and most other countries 
will likely follow our lead. If the Biden climate pro-
posals don’t make it through Congress, then it will be 
a much more difficult row to hoe.  
Will carbon markets make farmers rich? No, unless 
you become a successful carbon credit speculator (and 
if you do, you are wasting your time as a farmer). Per-
haps carbon credits will evolve into a meaningful 
component of farm or ranch income but it won’t hap-
pen overnight and a lot of things that have never hap-
pened will need to happen soon (like the U.S. agreeing 
to limits its carbon emissions).  
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